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The pool of early retirees is characterized by a large heterogeneity along several criteria. The 
present paper focuses on the key distinction between those in forced early retirement and 
those who retire early by individual choice. We start by estimating a retirement probit model 
for older workers in Belgium. Based on these estimates, we then perform micro-simulations 
relating to a hypothetical actuarial reform of a pension system, i.e., a reform imposing on 
average actuarial neutrality with respect to the time of retirement. We explore two scenarios, 
one where the entire population is subjected to the actuarial system, and one where a duly 
screened sub-sample of the unemployed is shielded against these actuarial adjustment 
factors, a group we call the truly unemployed. We evaluate the impact on the average 
retirement age, the pension budgets as well as indicators of redistribution within the group of 
the elderly. We find that the extra budgetary gain of exposing this subgroup to the full-blown 
reform is modest, while the distributional cost is rather high. Our results thus comfort the idea 
that the budgetary cost of a focused unemployment system are moderate, and that returning 
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1. Introduction 
Major demographic challenges lie ahead of the Belgian social insurance systems. Under the 
simultaneous effect of decreasing fertility and increasing life expectancies, pension systems 
all across the developed world are facing an uncertain future, Belgium being no exception to 
this rule. The structural weakness of these systems is their predominant pay-as-you-go 
structure whereby the cohort of those currently working finances the current retirees.  
 
The Belgian social insurance system faces a simultaneous – and less universal - challenge. 
The marked decline in the average retirement age over the last few decades puts an additional 
financial burden on the systems, Belgium being among the countries with the lowest average 
retirement age. (see Blöndal and Scarpetta, 1998 and Dellis et al, 2004)  
 
While the budgetary implications of the purely demographic challenges are rather well 
understood, the same clearly does not hold true for the overall costs of the early retirement 
programs. The explicit and implicit budgetary costs of early retirement programs are often 
hard to evaluate as they are (willingly or unwillingly) split in (unequal) fractions among a 
series of different actors and budgets. Against this backdrop, the literature has focused on 
three isolated topics. First, there is the evaluation and projection of the budgetary costs of 
aging and the determination of reforms to the pension system to assure its longer-run 
viability. The ongoing research on long-term projections of public expenditures can be seen as 
a prime example (Conseil Supérieur de Finances, 2004). In general, the research on the 
viability of pension schemes has generally remained very partial in the sense that it often 
neglected the explicit or implicit budgetary cost of these early retirement arrangements. 
 
Secondly, there has been a substantial and coordinated effort all across the developed world to 
get a better idea of the key determinants of the retirement decision (see for example Gruber 
and Wise, 1999 and 2004). This literature has been interested in both the demand and the 
supply sides of the labor market, as well as on the role that governments play on these 
markets. In a recent paper, Dellis et al (2004) focus their attention on the determinants of 
labor supply in Belgium. The authors estimate several models inspired by the methodology of 
Stock and Wise (1990) where rational utility maximizers choose their retirement age so as to 
optimize their well-being over the life-cycle. A frequent criticism of this approach challenges 
the key underlying assumption. Individuals are supposed free to choose the optimal retirement 
date from within the menu determined by retirement and early retirement programs. In the 
European context, this objection is particularly acute when thinking about industrial 
restructuring and plant closure (steel,…) as well as the transition of the countries of central 
and eastern Europe to market economies. A recent survey (Elchardus and Cohen, 2003) finds 
that more than 40 percent of Belgian male retirees have left involuntarily into retirement or 
early retirement, the figure being closer to 30 percent for females. Though clearly a self-
reported measure, this figure is rather striking by its sheer size, as it would mean that a little 
less than one in two Belgian males did not have full control over his transition into retirement. 
It does however not mean that this decision is automatically different from the one the 
individual would have freely and rationally made.  
 
Unlike the above approaches that focus on the various costs associated with the retirement 
systems – be it under the form of government's budgets or efficiency costs due to distortions 
in the labor-leisure choice – a third strand of the literature has attempted to evaluate the 
outcome of the social protection and pension schemes in terms of income of the elderly, 
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inequality and poverty (see for example Disney and Johnson, 2001 and more recently in 
Desmet et al, 2005).  
 
In the present paper we unite these different approaches. Our dataset consists of a 
representative sample of the Belgian population aged between 50 and 64 in the mid 1990's. In 
our analysis, we focus our attention on the wage earners in the sample.1 We do so by 
exogenously splitting the population of those who leave the labor force early into two 
subgroups in the above-mentioned proportions. Our aim is to separate the people with a true 
need for insurance against the risks of disability, unemployment and collective early 
retirement from those who rationally opt for benefits from either of these systems. For reasons 
of simplicity, we call those who are involuntarily unemployed the "true" (unemployed), and 
by opposition those who follow individual utility maximization the "optimizers". Our analysis 
should be seen as a first-pass look at the question. As such, the procedure for separating the 
true unemployed from the optimizers should not be seen as a workable real-world alternative, 
but rather as a procedure to illustrate the orders of magnitude involved.  
 
Once separated into subgroups, we analyze the retirement decision of all these individuals 
using the micro-estimation approach of Dellis et al (2004) to derive parameters describing 
their sensitivity to key social policy parameters. The basic aim we pursue is to propose a 
method for separating these two sub-groups by dissuading those who simply optimize into the 
systems. We therefore expose the entire population or a subgroup thereof to a parametric 
reform of the Belgian social insurance system and evaluate the budgetary impact and some 
measures of the distributional incidence. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the general institutional setting of 
the Belgian social insurance regime with a special focus on wage earners. In section 3 we 
describe the data and the estimation strategy of our retirement model allowing for the 
population of early retirees to be split into true unemployed and optimizers. Section 4 
contains the results of the micro-estimations. Section 5 documents the results of two 
simulation exercises from a budgetary and a distributional point of view. Section 6 concludes 
the paper.  
 
2. Institutional settings 
Belgium is characterized by the presence of several retirement income programs. Public social 
security programs still account for a dominant share of pension income of the elderly. Private 
programs, though very small in size, are the segment that experiences the strongest growth. In 
the past, so-called second pillar private pension schemes have essentially been confined to the 
higher-income workers as well as the self-employed. The segment is however expected to 
growth steadily in the near future because of legislation enacted in the year 2002 expanding 
the array of eligible products and the tax-favored nature of second pillar pension plans.2 Third 
pillar individual retirement arrangements take multiple forms. They range from the tax-
favored individual pension savings accounts with a maximum annual contribution of EUR 
                                                 
1 Two motivations underlie our decision to focus our analysis on wage earners. A first reason is institutional, as 
wage earners are the only group of the population that is eligible for unemployment benefits. A second reasons is 
data availability, as the set of information available on wage earners is by far the richest in the Belgian context. 
2 The new plans are essentially geared towards private sector wage earners. The details of the pension plan are 
linked to the industry as well that the company that the worker is affiliated with. The precise details of these 
pension arrangements, such as the degree of solidarity between workers, as well as the size of the contributions 
are negotiated between the workers and the employers at the level of the company and/or the industry. 
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600 per person (in the year 2003) or under the form of more traditional savings vehicles such 
as the tax-favored savings accounts, investments in trust funds, life insurance, etc. 
 
The public retirement income system consists of four segments. The three main programs are 
essentially organized on a sectoral basis and are Bismarckian in nature. There is one social 
security program for the public sector, one for the private sector wage earners and one for the 
self-employed. The fourth component of the public system is a means-tested element that 
pays out a minimum benefit on the basis of need. 
 
The wage earner’s pension scheme we focus on is by far the largest one according to the 
number of people affiliated with the program. It is also the largest scheme in terms of the total 
annual amount of contributions and benefits payments. The normal retirement age is fixed at 
65 while early retirement is possible as of age 60. The program does not impose any actuarial 
adjustment for early claiming of benefits. However, most workers will actually be 
characterized by age-of-retirement-dependent social security benefits because of an 
incomplete career adjustment. The reason for this is that to have a full earnings history, 
workers have to have accumulated 45 years in insured status. Benefits are adjusted for 
incomplete career length, and a dropout year provision applies for those with a career that is 
longer than 45 years. The said standard of a normal retirement age of 65 with a 45-year career 
is at present only fully applicable to male workers. Women are in a transitory regime that 
progressively shifts the complete career standard from 40 to 45 years and the normal 
retirement age from 60 to 65 by the year 2009. Hence, for most women included in our 
analysis, normal retirement is still set at the age of 60 with a full-career length of 40 years. 
 
Benefits are computed based on the earnings during periods of affiliation with the scheme. 
The benefit formula, which is subject to floors and ceilings, can be represented as follows: 
 
Gross Benefit = k * Min(n,N)/N * average wage 
 
where n represents the number of years of affiliation with the wage earner’s scheme, N the 
number of years required for a full career, thus ranging from 40 to 45 years depending on the  
sex and year of birth of the insured worker. k is a replacement rate that takes the value of 0.6 
or 0.75 depending on whether the social security recipient claims benefits as a single or as a 
household. The variable “average wage” corresponds to gross average indexed wages at the 
time of retirement. Past earnings are indexed using the evolution of the consumer price index 
combined with occasional additional discretionary adjustments for the evolution of growth 
(particularly for earnings going back to the 1960's and 1970's). Periods of the life spent on 
replacement income (unemployment benefits, disability benefits, workers compensation…) 
have a double effect on benefits. First, they count towards completing the earnings history by 
adding additional years of earnings to the workers earnings history, hence increasing the 
variable n. Second, they also affect the computation of the average wage variable. Time spent 
on retirement income also enters the average wage formula by means of fictive earnings. 
Fictive earnings correspond to the extrapolation of a worker's last earnings prior to joining the 
social insurance program. Fictive earnings are shielded against inflation and hence imply a 
constant real earnings profile entering the pensions formula for time spent on replacement 
income. It is important to notice that these fictive earnings do not correspond to the benefit 
payouts under the various schemes that may sometimes be considerably different. 
 
Once retired, retired wage earners are also shielded against inflation through an automatic 
consumer price index (CPI) adjustment and are subject to an earnings test. New legislation 
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passed in 2002 increased the earnings limits by half hence increasing incentives for 
individuals to continue working after claiming benefits. Currently, the earnings limit is 
approximately EUR 10,845 (respectively EUR 7,422) per year above (respectively below) the 
normal retirement age. When earning more than these thresholds, pension entitlements are 
completely suspended until earnings drop back below the limits. Benefits are also paid to 
surviving spouses, or more generally surviving dependents of deceased wage earners.  
 
The wage-earners system is mainly financed through payroll taxes that are levied both on the 
side of the employers and of the employees, with a combined tax rate of 16.36 percent (no 
earnings limit). However, the system also receives a subsidy from the general budget of the 
Belgian federal government that corresponds to approximately 11 percent of overall benefit 
payouts. 
 
Next to the wage-earner pension system, several other pathways into retirement have 
progressively evolved, particularly in the 1980's and 1990's. These alternative routes 
essentially aim at making retirement possible before the earliest retirement age of the wage-
earner social security scheme. These early retirement schemes can be classified into two 
subgroups, mandatory collective early retirement schemes and individual early retirement 
arrangements. Notice that both ultimately lead into the social security system at the latest at 
the normal retirement age. All mandatory early retirement schemes are based on collective 
agreements between employers and employees, sometimes at the industry level, sometimes at 
the level of the company or even a single production site of a company. Early retirement ages 
as low as the age of 50 are not rare when the company is facing severe economic problems 
and needs to shed workers to restructure. These programs usually require the agreement of the 
federal government as it pays for a fair chunk of the early retirement benefits, be it through 
the unemployment insurance program or some other federal budget.  
 
Individual early retirement differentiates itself from its collective counterpart by the fact that 
it is based on an individual’s decision to retire from work. During the years analyzed in our 
sample, the most prevalent individual pathway into retirement is the unemployment insurance 
system, which does not impose any time limit on benefit recipience.3 The system is 
characterized by a total lack of experience rating. Workers desiring to retire could thus ask 
their employer to lay them off, without any financial cost to any of the parties involved. 
Similarly, employers could use the system to shed older more expensive workers and retain 
younger cheaper and more flexible workers.  
 
A special unemployment regime exists for a category of people called the ‘aged unemployed’. 
Until June 2002, unemployed aged 50 or more were automatically considered belonging to 
this category. The aged unemployed are essentially no longer subject to show up at the 
unemployment office on a regular basis or to actively look for work. Human resource 
managers discovered it as a perfect tool for terminating an individual employment relation at 
low cost to the employer. The technique, called "Canady Dry" pensions in the Belgian 
context, has dramatically reinforced the role of the unemployment insurance system as an 
early retirement route.4 The arrangement consists in the worker and his employer agreeing to 
have the employer lay off the worker. The latter thus becomes eligible for unemployment 
insurance payments within the framework of the aged-unemployed rules, hence with no 
                                                 
3 Disability insurance is not a major route towards early retirement due to rather stringent qualifying conditions 
and rather advanced screening. 
4 The name is an allusion to an advertisement for the soft drink "Canada Dry", which its sparkling and slightly 
bitter taste resembles an alcoholic beverage, but is none. On this issue, see OECD, 2003. 
 5
obligation to look for work or pay social insurance contributions, such as pension 
contributions. At the same time, he does not loose any entitlement to his future pension within 
the regular retirement regime of the wage-earners as time spent on unemployment insurance 
counts fully towards the pension, just the same way as if the person would have continued to 
work. To make the transaction worthwhile for the worker, he either gets a lump-sum payment 
or an annuity payment on behalf of the employer. Formally, this payment does not correspond 
to a pension entitlement though it admittedly looks and acts like one.  
 
The system of the 'aged unemployed' was reformed in July 2002 – at least in part because of 
the surge of Canady Dry pension arrangements. The reform tightens the rules for new entrants 
to the unemployment system.  The minimum age for a full waiver of obligations under the 
unemployment insurance system was raised from 50 to 56. A new system of "mini-waiver" 
was introduced on the periodic visits to the unemployment insurance as of age 50, but the 
person still needs to be ready to accept a job.  
3. Data and estimation strategy 
 
The dataset is identical to the one used by Dellis et al (2004) for their micro-estimation 
exercise. The summary statistics of the sample can be found in table 1 that is taken from the 
above-mentioned paper. The data stem from five sources, which are mostly of administrative 
origin. The data were matched and merged using individuals' national identification numbers. 
The dataset is extremely rich as it includes data from multiple sources for a representative 
fraction of the Belgian population in the years 1993, 1994 and 1995. The first component of 
the data is the SFR (Statistiques Fiscales des Revenus) information that is collected by the 
Finance Ministry. It records, all information relevant for the computation of every 
individual’s tax liabilities. A second component is the CIP (Comptes Individuels de Pension) 
that is collected by the wage-earners pension administration (ONP) since the mid 50's. It 
includes all career information relevant for the wage-earner pension computation: gross 
wages, days of work, days on social insurance programs, … Other data sources include data 
from the self-employed social insurance administration, the civil servant pension 
administration, and the 1991 Census. Dellis et al (2004) used a multi-step sample selection 
procedure to obtain a sample of households where at least one member of the household is in 
the 50-64-age bracket and has not yet retired. A total of 21,818 households were used to 
analyze retirement decisions of men and women separately. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (TO BE UPDATED SHORTLY – ONLY SLIGHT CHANGES) 
Summary Statistics Males Females 
  (Std)  (Std) 
Observations Number 23,238  9,707  
Retired (%) 8.6  9.9  
Age Mean 54.9 (3.7) 54.2 (3.5) 
     
Married (%)   80.6  66.1  
Inactive Spouse (%) 66.4  30.7  
Age Difference Mean 2.7 (4.0) -1.9 (3.9) 
     
Earnings Mean 24,017 (19,758) 15,252 (11,901) 
Spouse's Earnings Mean 6,163 (9,990) 19,865 (14,004) 




Number Retiring within the next year (%) Number 
Retiring within the 
next year (%) 
Age structure     
50-54 11,938 3.1 5,664 5.3 
55-59 8,200 9.8 3,149 9.0 
60-65 3,100 26.3 894 41.3 
Social Security Program     
Wage-Earner 13,135 9.6 5,242 11.0 
Self-Employed 3,984 5.0 1,080 7.5 
Civil Servant 6,119 8.6 3,385 8.8 
Region     
Brussels 1,850 9.1 1,330 8.7 
Flanders 14,715 8.6 5,197 10.4 
Wallonia 6,673 8.4 3,180 9.4 
Note: Observations correspond to person-year cells; retired people are those who have (early) retirement income 
and have income from work smaller than a threshold of approx. EUR 7,500. 
Source: Dellis et al (2004) 
 
 
To determine which factors influence the retirement decision of Belgian workers, we proceed 
to the estimation of a retirement probit model. In line with Dellis et al (2004), we introduce 
financial incentive variables among the right hand side variables determining the probability 
to retire from the active population. A first indicator is the concept of social security wealth 
(SSW), which is the present discounted value of all future benefit flows from the social 
security system. Discounting is done allowing both for time preference and mortality 
adjustments. Mortality adjustments are based on education-specific life-tables as computed by 
Deboosere and Gadeyne (2000) based on the 1991 Census and population registers. 
Depending on the household situation and the system, SSW also includes an element that is a 
function of dependent or survivor benefits. Further the SSW measure integrates payments 
originating in other retirement income systems. In the Belgian context, it is not infrequent to 
observe individuals collecting benefits from two or three of the main pension systems. We 
apply the official rules that exist for cumulating benefits from the three main public systems.  
 
SSW also allows for the possibility that people exit through different pathways into 
retirement. Depending on the system, people can first transit through unemployment, 
disability or early retirement systems when exiting from the labor force, and prior to entering 
the ranks of the retirees in one of the three main retirement systems. Hence, the SSW 
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indicator is a true weighted sum of discounted benefit streams in a variety of different states 
of nature.  
 
The next two incentive indicators are dynamic measures. “Accrual” represents the difference 
between the SSW tomorrow and the SSW today. “Peak value” represents the difference 
between SSW at its peak and SSW today. 
 
In contrast to Dellis et al (2004), we separate the population of those who retire from the job 
market through the early-retirement or the unemployment insurance scheme into two 
subgroups. For the first subgroup, the true unemployed, we suppose that they have very 
limited options on the labor market and that an exogenous process determines their labor 
market transitions. Once forced into early-retirement or unemployment, they are eligible for 
100 percent of the early-retirement and unemployment benefits.  At this stage, we would like 
to reemphasize that forced retirement can perfectly be fully individually rational. In fact, we 
interpret the survey evidence of Elchardus and Cohen (2003) claiming that more than 40 
percent of Belgian males faced forced retirement as indicator that at least for a share of these 
forced (early-) retirees the retirement decision must also have been worthwhile; otherwise 
protests would have been more widespread on the streets. Put differently, nothing precludes 
collectively rational decisions from being individually rational. Pushing this argument to the 
extreme, it is theoretically possible that although 40 percent of Belgian males claim that they 
were forced into retirement, not a single one actually took a decision different from the one he 
would have individually and rationally chosen and hence that the model of Dellis et al (2004) 
is an appropriate representation of reality. 
 
Other evidence however points in the direction of some level of true unemployment among 
the elderly workers. When looking at administrative data on unemployment, at least two 
strategies seemed imaginable. The first one was to look at the unemployment rate of younger 
cohorts that are not yet eligible for any of the early retirement arrangements. This first 
approach did not allow to net out cohort specific evolutions, such as different activity rates 
across cohorts most notably for females. The second was to look at a sample of countries 
characterized by less generous old-age unemployment schemes and much lower old-age 
unemployment, such as the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden and Norway) and the 
United Kingdom. The more restrictive nature of their systems makes it more unlikely that the 
majority of these individuals would have freely opted into the scheme if they had not been 
forced into unemployment by some exogenous shock. We thus decided combine the two 
strategies in a difference in difference approach. Using EUROSTAT data on inactivity rates, 
we computed the difference between the inactivity rate of the 50 to 64 year-old and the 25 to 
49 year-old for all countries concerned as an indicator of cohort-specific evolutions. We then 
compare the average of these differences for the reference countries from the figure we 
derived for Belgium. The result of this computation shows that approximately 44 percent of 
male and 40 percent of female aged unemployment can be explained by age-specific 
tendencies observed in other countries, while the remainder of the unemployment and early-
retirement observed in Belgium is of the optimizing kind.  
 
The second subgroup, the optimizers, faces a much broader choice, as their retirement 
decision is less deterministic. When evaluating different retirement dates, individuals compute 
the weighted SSW over the different possible pathways into retirement available at every 
single age. Optimally, we would integrate information on sectors of activity, education level 
and geographic region in our evaluation of the probabilities to exit the labor market. Given the 
lack of such detailed information, we use the countrywide observed frequencies of the early 
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retirement and the unemployment/disability routes to determine the weights applicable to all 
optimizers. More specifically, the weight corresponds to the frequency of departures into the 
respective programs net of departures by true unemployed that follow the above-mentioned 
purely exogenous process (see table 2). For wage earners, we add the unemployment 
insurance and disability insurance paths as the two systems produce very similar benefit 
structures. Doing so, we give an upper bound on incentives for people to retire as we render 
all of disability voluntary. Given the lack of information for the public sector, we consider as 
early retirees all people retiring before the age of 60. 
 
Our analysis is extreme, in the sense that we stylize people of any age cohort into two extreme 
subgroups, once purely passive and once totally active. To overcome the problem of deciding 
who is active and who is passive, we decided to expose every individual who retires within a 
given year to the two situations. The way we put this into practice is by "cloning" individuals 
who retire, while simply applying the optimizing model to all other individuals. We then 
allocate the probability of 44% and 40% for men and women, respectively, to the event that 
the person exogenously had to leave his job, and the remaining probability on the alternative 
state of the world. Our modelization also takes into account that every individual who 
currently belongs to the optimizers might one day in the future become a true unemployed 
and hence eligible for 100 percent of those benefits. Table 3 presents the age- and sex-specific 
probabilities of transition into true unemployment that we derived. 
 














       
50 0.456 0.392 0.152 0.649 0.156 0.195 
51 0.474 0.392 0.134 0.689 0.155 0.156 
52 0.486 0.390 0.123 0.702 0.157 0.140 
53 0.508 0.382 0.110 0.734 0.142 0.125 
54 0.528 0.373 0.099 0.763 0.122 0.115 
55 0.544 0.369 0.086 0.795 0.115 0.089 
56 0.583 0.339 0.078 0.838 0.095 0.067 
57 0.627 0.311 0.063 0.894 0.078 0.028 
58 0.719 0.236 0.046 0.953 0.030 0.017 
59 0.838 0.123 0.038 0.997 0.000 0.003 
60 0.875 0.094 0.031 1.000 0.000 0.000 
61 0.900 0.072 0.028 1.000 0.000 0.000 
62 0.939 0.040 0.020 1.000 0.000 0.000 
63 0.982 0.011 0.007 1.000 0.000 0.000 
64 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
65 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Source: Authors' computations 
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Table 3: Probability of forced early retirement or forced unemployment  
Men Women 
Age 
Early retirement Unemployment/ disability Early retirement 
Unemployment/ 
disability 
     
50 0.005 0.002 0.013 0.004 
51 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.003 
52 0.007 0.012 0.019 0.012 
53 0.006 0.012 0.017 0.017 
54 0.008 0.013 0.009 0.013 
55 0.010 0.029 0.020 0.015 
56 0.008 0.026 0.016 0.013 
57 0.014 0.053 0.026 0.024 
58 0.013 0.079 0.010 0.025 
59 0.009 0.029 0.004 0.012 
60 0.007 0.034 0.000 0.000 
61 0.006 0.025 0.000 0.000 
62 0.012 0.023 0.000 0.000 
63 0.014 0.020 0.000 0.000 
64 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
65 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Source: Authors' computations 
 
 
The advantage of our strategy is that we explore the available information to a maximum as 
we expose every single individual profile to these two scenarios. The major drawback of our 
approach - and of our dataset - is that we do not take into account that the probability to be 
forced into retirement is distributed unequally across the population, with some job profiles, 
and some industries being much more likely subject to an exogenous shock than others. 
 
Our strategy is not void of economic sense. Though admittedly imperfect, our approach has 
the advantage of recognizing the diversity within the pool of the unemployed. It is rather a 
first-pass analysis of the implication of applying actuarial reforms to a pool of persons that are 
truly unemployed or truly disabled. It should neither be seen as a truthful representation of 
reality, nor as a usable tool for socio-economic policy-making. The distinction between true 
unemployed and optimizers is hard to make in reality. In this respect, the literature on 
disability insurance (DI) can serve as a good guide of what is feasible, and why it is 
interesting to make simulations explicitly taking these subgroups into account rather than 
simply lumping them together. There exist an important empirical literature on the effect of 
DI on labor supply and retirement.5 Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986) study the case of 
workers forced to retire early due to a disability that occurs without an observable prior 
signal. Truly disabled people cannot be separated from those purely claiming to be disabled. 
They show that the optimal DI insurance program with no cheating implies benefits rising 
with the age at which one starts to draw benefits, but by less than would be actuarially fair. 
Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) propose a model to structure optimal disability benefits in a 
world close to the U.S. social security system. They point out that designing optimal benefits 
requires a balancing of income redistribution objectives and labor supply disincentives. Faced 
with necessarily imperfect screening devices to determine whether a physical or mental 
disability translates into a labor supply problem, policy makers have different options at their 
hand. One is the separation of those disabilities that are easier to observe and verify (in our 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Bound (1989, 1991) and Parsons (1991) 
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case the "truly unemployed") into a specific system, and all other individuals into one less 
generous system along the lines of the Diamond-Mirrlees model.6  
 
4. Probit estimates 
 
We estimate a series of probit models to evaluate the impact of financial incentive variables 
on the probability of retirement. Our approach is one of micro-estimation as we use individual 
and family level data on workers to evaluate the impact of financial variables on the decision 
to retire, taking into account a series of control variables such as demographics and family 
status. The estimates allow us to get an idea of the way the Belgian social insurance system as 
an institution influences individual decision-making among elderly workers.  
 
                                                 
6 See Cremer et al (2003) 
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Table 4: Retirement Probits for Men 
Accrual Peak Value 
Age Age Dummies Age Age Dummies Explanatory variables 
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
Intercept -8.2592 0.2743 -0.3992 0.1978 -8.1734 0.2746 -0.3251 0.1978
Incentive Measures    
SSW (1000’s) 0.0009 0.0003 0.0009 0.0003 0.0009 0.0003 0.0009 0.0003
Probability effect (0.0089) (0.0087) (0.0090) (0.0090) 
AC, PV (1000’s) -0.0426 0.0015 -0.0410 0.0016 -0.0378 0.0015 -0.0361 0.0015
Probability effect (-0.4220) (-0.3960) (-0.3689) (-0.8731) 
Demographic Variables    
Age 0.1145 0.0039 . . 0.1140 0.0039 . .
Married -0.0863 0.0506 -0.0905 0.0512 -0.0828 0.0506 -0.0875 0.0512
Active Spouse -0.0651 0.0403 -0.0674 0.0408 -0.0628 0.0401 -0.0652 0.0406
Age Difference 0.0041 0.0039 0.0041 0.0040 0.0033 0.0039 0.0033 0.0040
Dependent -0.0819 0.0364 -0.0752 0.0367 -0.0855 0.0362 -0.0793 0.0365
Income Earnings Variables    
Life Cycle Earnings  0.0113 0.0074 0.0125 0.0076 0.0112 0.0074 0.0124 0.0076
Earnings (1000’s) -0.0090 0.0013 -0.0092 0.0013 -0.0091 0.0013 -0.0092 0.0013
Spouse Earnings (1000’s) -0.0009 0.0025 -0.0007 0.0026 -0.0008 0.0025 -0.0007 0.0026
Age and Schemes Dummies     
Age50   -2.1776 0.1154   -2.1866 0.1151
Age51   -2.1337 0.1167   -2.1536 0.1164
Age52   -1.9018 0.1128   -1.9218 0.1126
Age53   -1.8853 0.1134   -1.8806 0.1131
Age54   -1.7174 0.1122   -1.7443 0.1119
Age55   -1.5132 0.1081   -1.5358 0.1079
Age56   -1.5290 0.1093   -1.5639 0.1090
Age57   -1.3346 0.1077   -1.3580 0.1075
Age58   -1.1717 0.1081   -1.1896 0.1079
Age59   -1.4089 0.1159   -1.4657 0.1155
Age60   -0.6738 0.1062   -0.6909 0.1060
Age61   -0.6800 0.1103   -0.7020 0.1100
Age62   -1.1529 0.1211   -1.1668 0.1209
Age63   -1.0814 0.1257   -1.0985 0.1254
Age64   -1.0917 0.1350   -1.1053 0.1347
Civil Servant 0.3251 0.1405 0.3184 0.1433 0.3134 0.1413 0.3075 0.1442
Self-Employed 0.0603 0.1371 0.0735 0.1396 0.0159 0.1374 0.0286 0.1401
Pseudo R2 0.2167 0.2331 0.2094 0.2265 
Source: Authors' computations 
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Table 5: Retirement Probits for Women 
Accrual Peak Value 
Age Age Dummies Age Age Dummies Explanatory variables 
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
Intercept -6.3015 0.3659 -0.0943 0.2857 -6.4912 0.3649 -0.0211 0.2851
Incentive Measures    
SSW (1000’s) 0.0002 0.0003 0.0006 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0008 0.0003
Probability effect (0.0025) (0.0082) (0.0052) (0.0110) 
AC, PV (1000’s) -0.0406 0.0025 -0.0304 0.0028 -0.0274 0.0021 -0.0187 0.0022
Probability effect (-0.5800) (-0.4304) (-0.3902) (-0.2659) 
Demographic Variables    
Age 0.0898 0.0055 . . 0.0943 0.0055 . .
Married 0.1126 0.0663 0.0931 0.0678 0.1176 0.0658 0.0951 0.0675
Active Spouse -0.0127 0.0511 -0.0454 0.0523 -0.0535 0.0506 -0.0797 0.0519
Age Difference 0.0177 0.0059 0.0122 0.0060 0.0171 0.0059 0.0109 0.0060
Dependent -0.1805 0.0536 -0.1913 0.0541 -0.1762 0.0534 -0.1907 0.0539
Income Earnings Variables    
Life Cycle Earnings  0.0164 0.0097 0.0141 0.0099 0.0178 0.0098 0.0153 0.0100
Earnings (1000’s) -0.0118 0.0025 -0.0113 0.0025 -0.0125 0.0025 -0.0120 0.0025
Spouse Earnings (1000’s) -0.0021 0.0019 -0.0016 0.0019 -0.0017 0.0019 -0.0012 0.0019
Age and Schemes Dummies     
Age50   -1.7466 0.2189   -1.7706 0.2189
Age51   -1.6519 0.2199   -1.7083 0.2197
Age52   -1.5488 0.2192   -1.5934 0.2190
Age53   -1.4545 0.2196   -1.5002 0.2194
Age54   -1.5099 0.2207   -1.5536 0.2206
Age55   -1.2530 0.2187   -1.2920 0.2187
Age56   -1.4108 0.2205   -1.4452 0.2205
Age57   -1.2637 0.2204   -1.2891 0.2203
Age58   -1.4141 0.2243   -1.4604 0.2241
Age59   -1.5604 0.2292   -1.6201 0.2286
Age60   -0.3419 0.2178   -0.3124 0.2176
Age61   -0.0979 0.2235   -0.0729 0.2233
Age62   -1.3016 0.2567   -1.2658 0.2560
Age63   -1.2073 0.2646   -1.1806 0.2640
Age64   -0.7558 0.2726   -0.7456 0.2721
Civil Servant 0.1766 0.1078 0.1397 0.1101 0.2079 0.1079 0.1623 0.1105
Self-Employed -0.0654 0.1106 -0.0736 0.1131 -0.0897 0.1103 -0.0939 0.1130
Pseudo R2 0.1692 0.2062 0.1586 0.1999 
Source: Authors' computations 
 
We estimate models using both accrual and peak value indicators for dynamic incentives, to 
allow for the varying time horizons that are potentially relevant for an individual's decision to 
retire, namely the instantaneous incentive to retire and the longer-run incentive to retire. We 
use two different specifications of the age variables, once linear and once under the form of 
dummy variables. The models with the dummy variables are presented to allow for non-
linearities that our incentive measures do not fully capture. Indeed, a common feature in the 
retirement literature all across the world is that models based on financial incentive variables 
alone cannot explain the high hazard rates that we observe at key ages. Examples are the high 
exit rates at the earliest early retirement age as well as at the normal retirement age that cannot 
purely be based on financial incentives, the former being partly due to the fact that people do 
not think about dissociating retirement and claiming of benefits (see Coile et al, 2003) and the 
latter due to some peer/social pressure not to work beyond a given age. The problem with the 
dummy variable models is clearly identification, as it is hard or impossible to separate out 
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these other effect from the one due to the functioning of the (early-) retirement systems 
through financial incentives. 
 
Results are presented in tables 4 and 5. Our findings are rather coherent with respect to those 
of Dellis et al (2004), in the sense that parameter estimates hardly vary at all. Remember that, as 
indicated in Section 3, the main difference between both studies relies on the way pathways to 
retirement and probabilities to be forced to retired are taken into account in the computation of the 
incentive variables (Accrual and Peak Values). The only key difference is that the sign on the SSW 
parameter changes from negative to positive (significant for males). This means that we now 
have a positive wealth effect, indicating that when people become wealthier in terms of 
expected benefit payouts, their probability to retire increases. This finding is more plausible 
than the equally significant finding of the previous authors that the wealth effect is negative 
and that it is only the dynamic incentive variable that influences the individual's decision in 
the correct direction. The estimates we find for the accrual and peak value models that 
comfort us in our belief that the Belgian social security system produces incentives that are all 
across the board biased against continued work. We interpret this as strong evidence of the 
pervasive effects that social protection schemes can have on individual decision-making, 
particularly among those that we qualify as the optimizers.  
 
5. Simulation results 
 
To evaluate the importance of the individual incentives, and their signification for social 
policy-making, we now turn to a simulation exercise. We opt for an approach of micro-
simulation relying on the above data and estimates. We simulate a reform to the social 
protection scheme applicable to wage earners that renders it close to actuarially fair at the 
relevant margin, i.e. the decision to retire. More specifically, we simulate the effect of a 
change to the system that maintains the normal retirement age, but introduces a schedule of 
early retirement penalties under the form of actuarial adjustments. To determine the necessary 
actuarial adjustment, we turn to the evidence of Desmet and Jousten (2003) and approximate 
a schedule of adjustments that we apply to the wage-earner pension system (see table 6). 
Early retirement is allowed as early as age 50, extending the retirement window within the 
pension system from the current 60-65 to 50-65. 
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Table 6: Actuarial adjustment (unisex) 


















Source: Authors' approximations based on Desmet and Jousten (2003) 
 
As a complement to the extension of the statutory pension system, all other early retirement 
routes are closed or eliminated. We simulate two different approaches, one where all early 
retirement possibilities are totally eliminated in a sweeping clean-up of the system. This 
elimination is applicable to everybody subject to the wage-earner scheme, de facto 
eliminating any other kind of early exit route from the labor market after age 50. This first 
approach (called "total") has to be seen as an interesting reference scenario, though it clearly 
would be hard to defend on the political scene as it totally disregards people that are 
exogenously pushed into early-retirement, unemployment or disability. In some sense, it tries 
to make people obey by the rules of optimization without having the possibility to optimize...  
 
The second approach ("partial") is less extreme and politically more plausible in the sense that 
it takes into account the heterogeneity in the population by only exposing the optimizers to 
the reform, all other individuals continuing to be protected by the specific social insurance 
programs (unemployment, disability and early retirement) targeted at them. The emphasis has 
to be put on the importance of good targeting that can only be achieved by a well-functioning 
control mechanism allowing these specialized programs to screen applicants. Such screening 
is hard to perform in reality, and we do not pretend having the miracle solution to an old and 
often discussed issue. We do however think that targeting of these programs more in line with 
their original aims can easily be improved upon. In early 2004, discussions at the level of the 
Belgian federal government went precisely into this direction. The employment minister 
suggested some stronger screening of the pool of the unemployed, notably with respect to 
their willingness to take up new jobs. It would have been a low-cost method of reducing the 
use and abuse of the system for all kinds of purposes beyond pure unemployment insurance. 
At the same time, he also created a grants program devoted to firms that improve the working 
conditions of aged, experimented, workers. As other countries, Belgium is under pressure 
from the European Union to rapidly improve employment rates among the 55 to 64 year-old 
as a key condition to face the ongoing ageing process. For the first time in many years, firms 
and unions accepted to discuss about ways to reform the early retirement programs. Perhaps 
these are the best conditions to bring down today’s perverse incentive system. 
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Results are presented from three different perspectives, to illustrate the ramifications of any 
such reform. First, table 7 presents the outcomes of the baseline situation as well as the two 
reform scenarios for variety of models in terms of retirement age. As suggested in Gruber and 
Wise (2004), three different simulation methodologies are used that differ in the way they 
incorporate age effects in the changes. Methodology S1 is based on the estimates of the probit 
models using a linear age trend, but no dummies. Methodologies S2 and S3 rely on the 
dummy variable models. Simulation methodology S3 distinguishes itself from simulation S2 
along a single, but important margin. S3 shifts the estimated age-specific effects from the 
anchor-ages of the various preexisting (early-) retirement systems to the key ages of the 
reformed combined system. In this particular case of simulation the correct way to treat age-
specific dummies is to reduce their effect by the same reduction rate as the actuarial reduction 
rates presented in table 6. S2, on the other hand, leaves the dummy effects unchanged at the 
original anchor-ages.  
 
Table 8 presents the information of table 7 in variations. The results indicate that male wage-
earners increase their retirement age by an average of 1,6 to 4,7 years when implementing the 
reform for all individuals. The average impact is lower by approximately half a year when 
limiting the reform to the optimizers. This difference of half a year might at first look like 
very small. However, when focusing on the truly unemployed that we protect in the partial 
reform, we see that changes are very dramatic in their case, ranging from two months for the 
partial reform to a whopping increase of almost 8 years of the average retirement age. Our 
results indicate that it is important not to focus on the average retirement age in the country, 
such as illustrated by our figures in the columns relative to the complete sample but rather 




Table 7: Average Retirement Age 
Complete Sample 
(23326 men and 10579 women) 
Wage-Earners Only 
(13112 men and 5611 women) 
Protected Individuals and Spouses 
(500 men and 209 women) 
Simulated Reform Simulated Reform Simulated Reform 
Model Simulation Method Baseline 
Predicted Partial Total 
Baseline 
Predicted Partial Total 
Baseline 
Predicted Partial Total 
Men 
S1 58.57 59.33 59.58 57.87 59.01 59.45 54.02 54.21 59.10 
S2 58.48 59.28 59.52 57.74 58.95 59.37 54.09 54.28 59.04 Accrual (AC) 
S3 58.48 60.79 60.97 57.74 61.34 62.25 54.09 54.35 62.01 
S1 58.57 59.66 59.91 57.88 59.56 60.04 54.33 54.55 59.59 
S2 58.52 59.65 59.90 57.78 59.54 59.99 54.42 54.64 59.57 Peak Value (PV) 
S3 58.52 60.93 61.09 57.78 61.58 62.47 54.42 54.71 62.22 
Women 
S1 57.20 57.69 57.77 56.69 57.41 57.56 54.29 54.43 57.15 
S2 57.27 57.71 57.78 56.83 57.49 57.61 54.74 54.90 57.12 Accrual (AC) 
S3 57.27 59.15 59.28 56.83 60.33 60.63 54.74 55.33 59.95 
S1 57.17 57.86 57.94 56.66 57.69 57.82 54.77 54.91 57.37 
S2 57.24 57.84 57.90 56.80 57.70 57.80 55.22 55.37 57.29 Peak Value (PV) 
S3 57.24 59.20 59.31 56.80 60.40 60.66 55.22 55.83 60.01 
 
Table 8 : Average Retirement Age – Variation Relative to Baseline (in years) 
Complete Sample 
(23326 men and 10579 women) 
Wage-Earners Only 
(13112 men and 5611 women) 
Protected Individuals and Spouses 
(500 men and 209 women) 
Simulated Reform Simulated Reform Simulated Reform 
Model Simulation Method Baseline 
Predicted Partial Total 
Baseline 
Predicted Partial Total 
Baseline 
Predicted Partial Total 
Men 
S1 58.57 + 0.76 + 1.01 57.87 + 1.14 + 1.58 54.02 + 0.19 + 5.08 
S2 58.48 + 0.80 + 1.04 57.74 + 1.21 + 1.63 54.09 + 0.19 + 4.95 Accrual (AC) 
S3 58.48 + 2.31 + 2.49 57.74 + 3.60 + 4.51 54.09 + 0.26 + 7.92 
S1 58.57 + 1.09 + 1.34 57.88 + 1.68 + 2.16 54.33 + 0.22 + 5.26 
S2 58.52 + 1.13 + 1.38 57.78 + 1.76 + 2.21 54.42 + 0.22 + 5.15 Peak Value (PV) 
S3 58.52 + 2.41 + 2.57 57.78 + 3.80 + 4.69 54.42 + 0.29 + 7.80 
Women 
S1 57.20 + 0.49 + 0.57 56.69 + 0.72 + 0.87 54.29 + 0.14 + 2.86 
S2 57.27 + 0.44 + 0.51 56.83 + 0.66 + 0.78 54.74 + 0.16 + 2.38 Accrual (AC) 
S3 57.27 + 1.88 + 2.01 56.83 + 3.50 + 3.80 54.74 + 0.59 + 5.21 
S1 57.17 + 0.69 + 0.77 56.66 + 1.03 + 1.16 54.77 + 0.14 + 2.60 
S2 57.24 + 0.60 + 0.66 56.80 + 0.90 + 1.00 55.22 + 0.15 + 2.07 Peak Value (PV) 
S3 57.24 + 1.96 + 2.07 56.80 + 3.60 + 3.86 55.22 + 0.61 + 4.79 
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A second type of results relates to the budgetary impact of these reforms. While age-of–
retirement statistics give a good indication of the individual incentives to retire, they provide 
absolutely no guideline as to which budgetary impact they imply for the social insurance 
programs and the fiscal revenues in general. Along the lines of Desmet et al (2005) we 
evaluate the budgetary impact for a single age-of-birth cohort of 50 year-olds in 1993, 1994 or 
1995.7 Table 9 summarizes these findings both in present discounted value terms, as in 
relative terms. Our results indicate that the major part of the cost savings implied by our 
reforms occur under the form of reduced benefit flows. However, more than 20 percent of the 
sum of savings originates outside of the social insurance system in the fiscal departments of 
the government, be it through increased VAT payments on purchases or on additional payroll 
(social insurance) and income taxes on additional wage income during a prolonged working-
life. Our results indicate that savings of these two approaches to pension reform are 
substantial, and that the total reform dominates the partial one from a purely budgetary 
perspective.  
 
The third and last dimension we are interested in is the distributional side of any such reform 
proposal. In the present paper, we adopt a simplified, and maybe simplistic approach to the 
problem. To evaluate the distributional aspect of the problem, we turn to indicators of income 
inequality and poverty in the population at large, as well as for our subgroup of truly 
unemployed and protected individuals. These indicators are based on the lifetime income that 
is computed from age 50 until the end of life. It is obtained in the same way as present 
discounted values in table 9. Table 10 summarizes some key indicators. The change of the 
Gini coefficient across scenarios indicates that the strongest increase in inequality does not 
come from the actuarial nature of the reform in itself, but rather from the fact that the truly 
unemployed individuals are no longer protected from this actuarial reform. Hence, we have to 
conclude that it is essentially the truly unemployed that would bear the burden of the reform, 
as they are the ones that would suffer the biggest expected income loss of the population. 
Poverty rates as measured by the fraction of households with lifetime income below 50% of 
the average lifetime income also vary a lot across scenarios. Here, in contrast to the Gini 
indicator, we observe the strongest effect on the level of actuarial reform rather than on the 
fact of protecting the truly unemployed. Though the smallness might look surprising at first, it 
is actually rather plausible. Indeed, we observe that the subgroup of the truly unemployed 
faces a dramatically increased poverty rate when their protected status is taken away. On 
aggregate, this effect is much less noticed as the dramatic change in the poverty rate is only 
applicable to a small subgroup of the total population that suffers a lot from the reform, both 
in terms of average retirement age as in benefit levels. Hence, our results indicate that the 
social and redistributive costs of applying a total rather than a partial reform are likely to be 
enormous. In a cost-benefit spirit, this result has to be opposed to the difference in budgetary 
costs across scenarios. Our results of table 9 and 10 indicate that a total budgetary cost 
equivalent to some 2 to 3 percent of the expected flow of benefits could reduce the increase in 
inequality among the population as measured by the Gini coefficient by half.  
 
A full evaluation of the distributional aspects is well beyond the objectives of the present 
paper, as it would need a refined evaluation of the labor-leisure tradeoff along the option 
value approach. Given the heterogeneity in the population, a complete evaluation of the 
change in inequality would even necessitate a way of evaluating the relative value of leisure 
and labor of individuals respectively belonging to the truly unemployed and the optimizers.  
                                                 




Table 9: Total Fiscal Impact of Reform (in Eur per worker) 
PDV Total Changes Relative to Base Savings 
Simulated reform Simulated reform Simulated reform Benefits and taxes Baseline Partial Total Partial Total Partial Total 
Accrual – S1 
Benefits 146,930 128,098 126,021 - 12.8% - 14.2% 18,831 20,908 
Taxes : Payroll 58,716 62,459 63,225 6.4% 7.7% 3,743 4,508 
Taxes : Income 81,885 83,361 83,884 1.8% 2.4% 1,476 1,999 
Taxes : VAT 19,391 19,086 18,980 - 1.6% - 2.1% - 306 - 411 
Sum of Savings      23,744 27,004 
Accrual – S2 
Benefits 147,834 128,391 126,310 - 13.2% - 14.6% 19,443 21,524 
Taxes : Payroll 57,979 61,560 62,285 6.2% 7.4% 3,580 4,306 
Taxes : Income 80,964 82,289 82,774 1.6% 2.2% 1,325 1,810 
Taxes : VAT 19,366 19,029 18,921 - 1.7% - 2.3% - 336 - 445 
Sum of Savings      24,012 27,195 
Accrual – S3 
Benefits 147,834 130,737 128,803 - 11.6% - 12.9% 17,097 19,031 
Taxes : Payroll 57,979 68,330 69,482 17.9% 19.8% 10,351 11,503 
Taxes : Income 80,964 88,321 89,168 9.1% 10.1% 7,357 8,204 
Taxes : VAT 19,366 19,458 19,379 0.5% 0.1% 92 13 
Sum of Savings      34,897 38,751 
Peak Value – S1 
Benefits 147,073 130,312 128,369 - 11.4% - 12.7% 16,761 18,704 
Taxes : Payroll 58,538 66,488 67,490 13.6% 15.3% 7,951 8,952 
Taxes : Income 81,713 87,261 88,000 6.8% 7.7% 5,548 6,287 
Taxes : VAT 20,347 19,899 19,817 - 2.2% - 2.6% - 448 - 530 
Sum of Savings      29,812 33,413 
Peak Value – S2 
Benefits 147,915 130,837 128,901 - 11.5% - 12.9% 17,078 19,014 
Taxes : Payroll 57,896 65,626 66,586 13.4% 15.0% 7,730 8,691 
Taxes : Income 80,909 86,330 87,033 6.7% 7.6% 5,421 6,124 
Taxes : VAT 20,324 19,834 19,748 - 2.4% -2.8% - 489 - 575 
Sum of Savings      29,740 33,254 
Peak Value – S3 
Benefits 147,915 131,918 130,059 - 10.8% - 12.1% 15,997 17,856 
Taxes : Payroll 57,896 69,765 71,007 20.5% 22.6% 11,869 13,111 
Taxes : Income 80,909 89,791 90,720 11.0% 12.1% 8,882 9,811 
Taxes : VAT 20,324 20,283 20,229 - 0.2%  - 0.5% - 40 - 95 
Sum of Savings      36,708 40,683 
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Table 10: Gini indexes and poverty rates 
Simulated Reform Gini indexes and poverty rates Baseline Partial Total 
Accrual – S1 
Gini index 0.2366 0.2477 0.2628 
Overall poverty rate 7.03 8.71 8.99 
Poverty rate (protected individuals)  2.99 11.41 
Accrual – S2 
Gini index 0.2284 0.2451 0.2612 
Overall poverty rate 6.98 9.37 9.67 
Poverty rate (protected individuals)  3.13 12.27 
Accrual – S3 
Gini index 0.2284 0.2300 0.2477 
Overall poverty rate 6.98 6.33 6.45 
Poverty rate (protected individuals)  3.09 6.68 
Peak Value – S1 
Gini index 0.2369 0.2415 0.2601 
Overall poverty rate 6.90 7.59 7.79 
Poverty rate (protected individuals)  3.17 9.10 
Peak Value – S2 
Gini index 0.2286 0.2393 0.2590 
Overall poverty rate 6.98 8.48 8.71 
Poverty rate (protected individuals)  3.16 10.18 
Peak Value – S3 
Gini index 0.2286 0.2270 0.2448 
Overall poverty rate 6.96 6.05 6.14 




The analysis shows the large potential budgetary impact of various hypothetical 
reforms. These reforms, though clearly selected for comparative and illustrative 
purposes, illustrate the importance of behavioral effects that the citizens display when 
faced with a varying landscape in terms of the social insurance architecture. Different 
real-life reform alternatives are imaginable in the Belgian context. Any such real-life 
alternative will have to include – at least to some degree – some elements analyzed in 
our stylized scenarios, for example, changes in the key retirement ages or the use of 
actuarial adjustment factors, while at the same time not forgetting the labor demand 
side. Our full-blown reform admittedly looks somewhat unrealistic. In that sense, our 
partial reform is a first step in the direction of getting these hypothetical simulations 
closer to the field. The results indicate that even such a partial reform might have 
important consequences, not only in levels but also on the distributional side. The 
results of the present distributional analysis also illustrate the need to refine the 
analysis in future research.  
 
However, we have to insist that our analysis relies - like all long-run cost projections 
– on some assumptions we made, most notably the limitation to the cohort of 50 year 
olds as well as the steady state assumption, which both clearly limit the generality 
with which one can apply the above results to real-world proposals. Hence there is a 
clear need for further research to get reform proposals closer in line with politically 
feasible and economically viable alternatives over the long run. 
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The present paper shows that the social security system at large (i.e. including 
unemployment and disability insurance as well as early retirement schemes) induces 
Belgian workers to retire earlier than they ought to. Our reform simulations imply that 
we bring this comprehensive social protection package closer to actuarial fairness at 
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